geeman
02-24-2006, 07:15 PM
At 12:54 PM 12/29/2005, Lord Rahvin wrote:
>I don`t think it actually works that way in games though. Not unless we
>purposefully make the mechanics that way.
>
>Four units working together against four units will always wipe out an enemy
>faster and suffer less damage than sending four units to fight one at a
>time. The same works for four units against one, regardless of whether or
>not the one unit is weaker or stronger. Right? I mean, you could look to
>just about any adventuring game (D&D or otherwise) to see that PCs will
>never choose to hold back and let their teammate into battle because they
>know that all of them working together can dispatch an enemy quicker.
>
>In a tactical battle game you have a similiar situation. He who has more
>numbers and can concentrate the force of those numbers (easier to do in a
>game than in real life, I think...) on one opponent at a time, dispatching
>the opponent quicker and thus suffering less losses overall. In addition,
>deploying more of your units means the damage you recieve is a little more
>likely to be distributed rather than concentrated meaning your forces will
>not be dispatched as quickly.
>
>Am I wrong?
>
>I really want to make the game reflect the statement you made about
>reserves, and I`m looking for ideas on how to do that.
OK, let me first chime in to say I like this line of reasoning not
only because it follows a "real life" issue, but because I think it
could add an interested component to play fairly easily. That said,
here`s what I`m thinking: The main tactical issue with reserves has
to do with maneuver more than anything else. At least, as far as
might be portrayed in a game.... That is, once troops are engaged in
battle they become very difficult to maneuver and the maneuver that
they have available to them is generally very limited both in terms
of options and distance. Before battle a commander has the full
range of maneuver options available to him (to that extent that his
troops are capable of performing, that is, which is mostly a function
of training) but after troops start fighting the commander
effectively loses a lot of his control over them.
So, what I think might be a good, tactical use of reserves for the
issues you describe above is some way of reflecting how troops are
basically trapped or very difficult to maneuver once "engaged" or
"pinned" or otherwise designated as "in combat." In fact, it might
be prudent to recognize that troops once "committed" are basically no
longer under the control of the commander, or the commander may have
to perform some sort of check to regain control of them. It`s even
reasonable to have more than one level of this problem. Once a unit
is "committed" to a particular place on the battleline it becomes
more difficult for that unit to maneuver, then when it is "engaged"
it becomes another level more difficult to disengage and maneuver,
and lastly it might be possible to have a unit that was "pinned" down
to a particular location, totally incapable of maneuver until the end
of the battle or the commander pulls of a heroic act of
leadership. There are all kinds of parallels to literature, real
world battles and films that one could site to illustrate each of
these three conditions. Think of the movies where characters
actually describe themselves as being "pinned down" and are calling
for help, the situation of units in the middle of a defensive
battleline that really can either go forward, backward or die in
place. Things like that.
Each of the three conditions might suffer penalties to maneuver or
maybe other stats, depending on how one wants to interpret the
situation. It`s not unreasonable, for instance, to assume that a
unit that is "pinned down" suffers a penalty to its attack rolls as
the soldiers are basically fighting defensively and ducking for cover.
Using such a system the benefit of a reserve becomes clearer,
especially if one employs a system of facing or other advantage to
tactical positioning. Troops that are committed, engaged or pinned
are vulnerable to being outmaneuvered, overwhelmed and otherwise
destroyed in detail. A reserve would, therefore, be used by the
commander tactically to develop or respond to the moves of his
opponent. Using such a system one could portray the axiom "victory
goes to the one who commits his reserves last" kind of issue pretty well.
Gary
>I don`t think it actually works that way in games though. Not unless we
>purposefully make the mechanics that way.
>
>Four units working together against four units will always wipe out an enemy
>faster and suffer less damage than sending four units to fight one at a
>time. The same works for four units against one, regardless of whether or
>not the one unit is weaker or stronger. Right? I mean, you could look to
>just about any adventuring game (D&D or otherwise) to see that PCs will
>never choose to hold back and let their teammate into battle because they
>know that all of them working together can dispatch an enemy quicker.
>
>In a tactical battle game you have a similiar situation. He who has more
>numbers and can concentrate the force of those numbers (easier to do in a
>game than in real life, I think...) on one opponent at a time, dispatching
>the opponent quicker and thus suffering less losses overall. In addition,
>deploying more of your units means the damage you recieve is a little more
>likely to be distributed rather than concentrated meaning your forces will
>not be dispatched as quickly.
>
>Am I wrong?
>
>I really want to make the game reflect the statement you made about
>reserves, and I`m looking for ideas on how to do that.
OK, let me first chime in to say I like this line of reasoning not
only because it follows a "real life" issue, but because I think it
could add an interested component to play fairly easily. That said,
here`s what I`m thinking: The main tactical issue with reserves has
to do with maneuver more than anything else. At least, as far as
might be portrayed in a game.... That is, once troops are engaged in
battle they become very difficult to maneuver and the maneuver that
they have available to them is generally very limited both in terms
of options and distance. Before battle a commander has the full
range of maneuver options available to him (to that extent that his
troops are capable of performing, that is, which is mostly a function
of training) but after troops start fighting the commander
effectively loses a lot of his control over them.
So, what I think might be a good, tactical use of reserves for the
issues you describe above is some way of reflecting how troops are
basically trapped or very difficult to maneuver once "engaged" or
"pinned" or otherwise designated as "in combat." In fact, it might
be prudent to recognize that troops once "committed" are basically no
longer under the control of the commander, or the commander may have
to perform some sort of check to regain control of them. It`s even
reasonable to have more than one level of this problem. Once a unit
is "committed" to a particular place on the battleline it becomes
more difficult for that unit to maneuver, then when it is "engaged"
it becomes another level more difficult to disengage and maneuver,
and lastly it might be possible to have a unit that was "pinned" down
to a particular location, totally incapable of maneuver until the end
of the battle or the commander pulls of a heroic act of
leadership. There are all kinds of parallels to literature, real
world battles and films that one could site to illustrate each of
these three conditions. Think of the movies where characters
actually describe themselves as being "pinned down" and are calling
for help, the situation of units in the middle of a defensive
battleline that really can either go forward, backward or die in
place. Things like that.
Each of the three conditions might suffer penalties to maneuver or
maybe other stats, depending on how one wants to interpret the
situation. It`s not unreasonable, for instance, to assume that a
unit that is "pinned down" suffers a penalty to its attack rolls as
the soldiers are basically fighting defensively and ducking for cover.
Using such a system the benefit of a reserve becomes clearer,
especially if one employs a system of facing or other advantage to
tactical positioning. Troops that are committed, engaged or pinned
are vulnerable to being outmaneuvered, overwhelmed and otherwise
destroyed in detail. A reserve would, therefore, be used by the
commander tactically to develop or respond to the moves of his
opponent. Using such a system one could portray the axiom "victory
goes to the one who commits his reserves last" kind of issue pretty well.
Gary